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Abstract
This paper uses data from the NLSY97 to estimate the degree to which youth
criminal participation is related to household economic status. The ¯rst part of
the paper indicates that there exists a strong negative relationship between house-
hold economic status and youth participation in serious crimes, with youth from
households in the poorest third of the wealth distribution being over 65 percent
more likely to have participated in a serious crime over the observation period than
youth coming from households in the richest third of the wealth distribution. How-
ever, I show that the strength of this estimated relationship will be signi¯cantly
understated if crimes are not limited to being serious in nature and/or household
income as opposed to household wealth is used to measure household economic sta-
tus. The latter part of the paper then shows that most of the observed relationship
between household wealth and youth participation in serious criminal activity can
be accounted for by various measures of youth expectations of future opportunities,
neighborhood criminal exposure, and investments in children by parents.
¤Thanks to James Andreoni, Jenny Hunt, J. Karl Scholz, and James R. Walker for helpful comments.
11 Introduction
Understanding youth criminal activity is an issue of considerable importance for several
reasons. First and foremost, criminal careers most often begin during juvenile years,
with most chronic adult o®enders having had multiple contacts with the juvenile justice
system [Greenwood, 1995]. Furthermore, as Grogger [1995] and others have shown,
youth criminal activity can have long lasting ¯nancial consequences through limiting
future labor market opportunities. Evidence also suggests that youth criminal activity
appears to be a growing problem, especially relative to adult criminal activity. For
example, from 1985 to 1995 juvenile arrests in Florida for murder rose by 122 percent,
for robbery by 97 percent, for aggravated assaults 109 percent, and motor vehicle theft
by 85 percent [Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 1996]. Moreover, in the United
States as a whole, the rate at which adults were arrested for murder fell by roughly 7
percent between 1978 and 1993, yet the rate at which juveniles were arrested for murder
rose 177 percent over the same time period [Levitt, 1997].
Two key steps for understanding what policies may be e®ective at decreasing the
prevalence of youth criminal activity are to determine which group of youth are most
likely to engage in criminal behavior, and to understand what factors related to the
make-up of this group account for this increased criminal susceptibility. One commonly
held perception is that youth crime is a problem most closely tied to growing up in
poverty. Despite this perception, very little empirical work has documented any strong
relationship between youth criminal behavior and socio-economic status. In their anal-
ysis of 35 studies and 363 separate estimates of the class/crime relation, Tittle et al.
[1978] conclude that the assumed negative correlation between social class and criminal-
ity is a `myth'. Similarly, Thornberry and Farnworth [1982] ¯nd that, for the juvenile
2period, none of their measures of socio-economic status are strongly related to delinquent
involvement for either black or white subjects.
However, this apparent lack of an empirical relationship between a youth's criminal
behavior and socio-economic status may not be due to the lack of such a relationship,
but rather due to an overrepresentation of trivial o®enses in self-reported criminal par-
ticipation data, along with varying notions and imprecise measures of socio-economic
status. The ¯rst of these points was suggested by Elliot and Ageton [1980], who ex-
amined data from the 1977 National Youth Survey, and show that \lower" class youth
appear to engage in signi¯cantly more serious criminal activity than \middle" class
youth, but not necessarily more of all crimes.
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97), the
¯rst part of this study looks at these issues in more detail, focusing speci¯cally on the
relationship between youth criminal participation and household economic status. I ¯nd
that when participation in any crime is used to measure criminal participation, and a
snapshot of household income from a particular year is used to measure household eco-
nomic status, the estimated relationship between household economic status and youth
criminal activity is not very strong. Youth from households in the poorest third of the
income distribution are only about 21 percent more likely to participate in crime than
youth from households in the richest third of the household income distribution. How-
ever, once the de¯nition of criminal participation is limited to commission of serious
o®enses only, and household wealth rather than household income is used to measure
household economic status, the relationship becomes much stronger. Youth from house-
holds in the poorest third of the wealth distribution are estimated to be almost 70
percent more likely to participate in serious crime than youth from households in the
richest third of the wealth distribution.
3After statistically documenting this relationship between household economic status,
as measured by household wealth, and youth participation in serious crime, I attempt
to uncover what factors associated with household wealth can account for this relation-
ship. I focus on variables related to three general theories. Namely, are children from
poorer families more likely to participate in serious crime because they are exposed to
more criminal activity in their neighborhoods, because they expect to have fewer future
opportunities available to them, and/or because their parents are less able to invest
su±cient time, energy, and skill in their upbringing? While the data available in the
NLSY97 can only provide information on a small subset of the variables inherent in each
of these theories, the variables I am able to control for provide empirical support for
all three of the preceding theories. Moreover, when taken together, these variables can
account for the vast majority of the previously estimated relationship between house-
hold wealth and youth participation in serious crimes. In other words, almost all of
the strong relationship between household wealth and youth criminal participation can
be traced to observable characteristics that di®er between rich and poor youth. There-
fore, policies that a®ect these characteristics, and/or alter the cross-wealth di®erences
in these characteristics among youth, will likely have large impacts on youth criminal
participation.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 motivates why it may be
important to evaluate the relationship between household economic status and youth
criminal participation. The ¯rst part of Section 3 then describes the data to be used
and discusses how this data may be used to overcome some of the constraints inherent
in the previous literature. The second part of Section 3 then estimates the empirical
relationship between youth criminal participation and household economic status. In
Section 4, I attempt to evaluate what factors related to household economic status can
4help explain the youth crime-household economic status relationship. Finally, Section 5
summarizes and concludes.
2 Theoretical Relationships Between Youth Criminal Par-
ticipation and Household Economic Status
The underlying conditions that cause individuals to engage in criminal activity are cer-
tainly plentiful. As a way of organizing the discussion, much of the economics literature
related to crime and criminal participation has started with Becker's [1968] model of
rational criminal behavior. In this model, individuals decide whether or not to engage
in crime by weighing the bene¯ts of crime against the expected costs of committing
crime. In this formulation, the bene¯ts of crime not only include the monetary rewards
obtained from the criminal activity, such as money from drug sales or robberies, but
also allows for bene¯ts in the form of increased respect and psychic satisfaction resulting
from the criminal acts themselves. Similarly, the expected costs of criminal behavior
take into account the probability of getting caught, the disutility of the punishment if
caught, the opportunity costs of the time it takes to commit the crimes and possibly
spend time in jail, the e®ects of arrests on future wages, as well as the moral psychic
costs associated with breaking the law.
Most of the empirical studies related to this model have focused either on the labor
market tradeo®s associated with arrests and criminal participation, or on how individ-
uals react to the greater costs of criminal activity associated with stricter sentencing
policies [Freeman, 1991; Witte, 1980; Levitt and Kessler, 1999; Levitt, 1998; Gould et
al., 2002; Grogger, 1998]. However, there are several plausible arguments suggesting
there may also exist a strong tie between household economic status and criminal par-
5ticipation, especially for youths. The most direct mechanism tying household economic
status to youth crime is that relatively poor youth may face, or may expect to face,
greater constraints on their future choice sets than youth from relatively better o® fam-
ilies. Hence, youth from poorer households may feel their future choice set to be limited
in the ¯rst place, making the potential consequences of an arrest on this future choice
set minimal. For example, because of household credit constraints, lack of information,
underperforming schools, or a variety of other reasons, youth from poor households may
feel a college degree to be relatively unlikely regardless of their criminal behavior. Hence,
they may feel an arrest will not substantially alter their expected choice set regarding
college or career. In terms of the Becker model, these lesser perceived costs will then
make youth coming from poorer families more prone to criminal participation.
Another reason why youth from poorer households may be more prone to engage in
criminal behavior is because peer and community sanctions against those who commit
crimes may not be as severe in poor communities. There is a large literature on how peers
and interactions with neighbors may a®ect criminal behavior [Roncek, 1981; Sampson,
1994; Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Schienkman, 1996; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Wilson, 1987,
1995]. While there are certainly many distinctions, variations, and discrepancies among
these theories, in general they posit that the psychic cost to committing a crime is smaller
when criminal activity, or people who are known to participate in criminal activity, are
a large and visible part of the community. Similarly, Krivo and Peterson [1996] argue
that community environments where individuals are exposed to criminal activity, have
less access to jobs, and encounter relatively few role models of economic success, impede
communities from maintaining basic institutional structures and social control. Hence,
youth growing up in these poorer neighborhoods with a relatively high proportion of
criminals may perceive lesser psychic costs associated with criminal participation than
6youth from wealthier neighborhoods.
Looking at a randomized housing voucher experiment, Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirsch¯eld
[2001] ¯nd evidence consistent with such neighborhood e®ects on youth crime. They ex-
amine the e®ects of a randomized housing experiment on youth criminal activity. In the
experiment they examine, families living in certain high poverty neighborhoods could
sign up to be eligible for housing subsidy experiment. Those families who signed up
to participate in the experiment either: received assistance to relocate to a low poverty
neighborhood (experimental group), received a voucher they could use toward relocating
with no constraints (section-8 group), or received no assistance (control group).1 Their
evidence shows that youth from both the experimental group and the section-8 group
experience a signi¯cant reduction in violent-crime arrests relative to controls. However,
relative to controls, the youths from families in the experimental group did have some-
what higher rates of property-crime arrest, but only for a time-period shortly after the
move. In general, their evidence is consistent with peer e®ects with respect to crime.
Finally, a child's proclivity toward criminal activity may depend on the time, energy,
and skill the child's parents are able to invest in his or her upbringing. Because poorer
parents are likely to have relatively in°exible and physically demanding jobs, are far
more likely to be single caregivers, and live in more stressful surroundings than richer
parents, poorer parents may have less time and energy to make substantial upbringing
investments in their children than their richer counterparts. Furthermore, if education
and age make parents more e±cient at making these investments for any given amount of
time and energy invested, the fact that poor parents are often younger and less educated
may further impede the ability of less economically well-o® parents to e®ectively navigate
1They found that 53 percent of those families in the experimental group chose to relocate and 73
percent of those families in the section-8 group chose to relocate.
7their children away from risky behavior such as crime.
All of the previous arguments are potentially important for e±cient youth anti-crime
initiatives, in that they describe which youth may be most e®ectively targeted and what
factors make this group systematically more prone to crime. However, the obvious
implication necessary for any or all of these arguments to be true is that youth from
poorer households should be more likely to engage in criminal participation. The next
section examines whether this result appears to hold true, and why several previous
empirical studies have di®ered in their ¯ndings concerning this crucial relationship.
3 Empirically Documenting the Relationship Between Youth
Criminal Participation and Household Economic Resources
In studies of the empirical relationship between di®erent measures of socio-economic
status and youth criminal participation, the most notable constraint has been obtain-
ing accurate and representative data on criminal activity. Arrest data is problematic
because it is not representative of all individuals who participate in criminal activity,
rather only those who were caught and deemed arrest worthy by police. Victimiza-
tion data on the other hand is often problematic because very little information, if any,
can be gathered about the perpetrator. For these reasons, using survey instruments to
gather self-reported criminal behavior has become a very attractive method for obtaining
criminal participation data.
There do, however, remain a variety of constraints inherent in self-reported criminal
activity data. One obvious constraint is that respondents may fail to report criminal
participation out of shame or fear of reprisal. Such underreporting may be particularly
problematic in cases where the respondent is directly questioned by an interviewer,
8especially if the interviewer is of a di®erent race, gender, or social class.
The other constraint of self-reported criminal activity data is the tendency for self-
reports to be overly broad. Speci¯cally, in order to get meaningful variation in the
data, many self-report survey instruments have been skewed toward behavior occurring
frequently in \nondelinquent" samples. As stated by Hindedlang et al. [1978], \trivial
items in self-report scales tend to swamp more serious items when, as is common, global
simple sum scales are used," causing these global scales to re°ect the correlates of trivial
delinquency, not the more serious criminal delinquency that is the concern of policy
makers and citizens. This has been an important constraint in studying the relationship
between youth criminal participation and socioeconomic status because, as stated by
Clelland and Carter [1980], \...the self-report measure systematically underestimates
serious criminality" suggesting that \self-report studies serve only to demonstrate that
social status is not related to youthful peccadillos."
A further constraint faced by studies attempting to document the correlation between
youth criminal participation and household socio-economic status is that the de¯nition
of socio-economic status that is used is often left vague, and even when speci¯ed, it may
be poorly measured. For example, even if socio-economic status is de¯ned relatively
narrowly to be the economic resources available to a household, many data sources
that contain information on youthful criminal behavior do not have direct information
on the youth's parents' ¯nances, or if they do, it is often reported by the youth and
therefore subject to substantial measurement error.2 Maybe more importantly, even
accurate information regarding a youth's parents' wages or income in a given year may
not accurately describe the overall ¯nancial resources applicable to a given household.
Wages and annual income often vary substantially from year to year and also do not
2For example, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.
9take into account the savings, assets, and dynastic wealth of a family. Therefore, wages
or annual income from any given year provide only a noisy measure of \permanent
income", where it is this permanent income that provides the true measure of a youth's
household's economic resources. Such measurement error will tend to understate any
empirical relationships between household resources and youth criminal behavior.3
3.1 Using the NLSY97 to Overcome Previous Data Constraints
As an attempt to overcome the constraints described above, this paper uses data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The NLSY97 is particularly
suited for studying the relationship between youth criminal participation and household
economic resources for several reasons. First, the sampled group was large, consisting
of over 8,000 respondents, resulting in substantial sample variation in responses for
even relatively infrequent behavior such as criminal participation. Second, the NLSY97
sample is constructed to be representative of all American youth born between 1980 and
1984. Hence, the ¯ndings obtained using the NLSY97 data can be more convincingly
extended to the youth population as a whole than ¯ndings obtained using a sample of
\at risk" or otherwise selectively sampled youth.
A third bene¯t of the NLSY97 is that the questions regarding criminal activity were
asked using a self-administered questionnaire via a laptop computer rather than through
a written survey or a face to face interview. Given the personal nature of these questions,
3In examining intergenerational income mobility, Solon [1992] and Zimmerman [1992] argue that
much of the correlation between father's and son's lifetime earnings is understated when the annual
earnings from only one year are used to measure permanent income. By pooling together several years
of earnings, or otherwise incorporating several years of income observations to measure permanent
income, they show that the correlation in earnings across generations is up to 2 times larger than found
in previous estimates that used the single year measures of permanent income.
10the increased privacy and con¯dentiality o®ered by the laptop may elicit substantially
more truthful responses than previously available from self-reported data sources.
Another bene¯t of the criminal participation questions in the NLSY97 is that they
are speci¯c enough to assess whether any reported illegal behavior consisted of serious
criminal acts that would likely lead to arrest if caught, or consisted of youthful indis-
cretions like petty theft and property destruction. As described in the previous section,
failing to distinguish between these di®erent crime severities can have important conse-
quences. In the analysis to follow, a respondent is classi¯ed as committing a \serious
crime" if he or she admitted to breaking and entering a locked building to steal, stealing
with a weapon or use of force, stealing a car, assault, selling narcotics, or earning over
$500 from drug sales, between the 1997 and 1998 interviews (the \observation year").4
As can be seen in Table I(a), about 28 percent of the sample admitted to committing a
crime during the observation year, with 15 percent admitting to committing a \serious
crime" (as de¯ned above) during this time period.5 Looking at di®erent subgroups, 34
4Technically, this `observation year' will be more than one year, as respondents in the sample used in
this analysis were interviewed an average of 19.9 months after completing the ¯rst round interview. The
length of this \observation year" does not appear to di®er substantially across the wealth distribution,
with the mean length for the youth from the poorest third of the household wealth distribution averaging
20.1 months between the ¯rst and second round interviews (with a standard error of 0.06), youth from
the middle third of the household wealth distribution averaging 19.8 months between interviews (with
a standard error of 0.06), and youth from the richest third of the household wealth distribution also
averaging 19.8 months between interviews (with a standard error of 0.05). Therefore, while observation
year for youth from the poorest third of the household wealth distribution does cover activity over a
longer period of time, the di®erence works out to only about 3/10 of a month or 9 days.
5The sample used to calculate these percentages consisted of all individuals interviewed in 1998 with
valid data for household net worth. Almost identical proportions are obtained if sample is restricted to
only those with valid data for household income from 1997. A few individuals refused to answer a crime
question or answered \don't know". However, since all of these respondents who refused to answer or
11percent of males admitted to committing a crime in this sample period, with 18 percent
admitting to participating in a serious crime, while only 23 percent of females admitted
to any crimes in this sample period and only 12 percent admitted to a serious crime. For
white males, the analogous proportions were 34 and 18 percent for each crime category,
while for black males the proportions are 31 and 21 percent for \all crimes" and \serious
crimes" respectively.
The NLSY97 also provides better data for measuring household economic status than
has been available previously. While the criminal participation data in the NLSY97
was collected directly from the youth respondent, information regarding the youth's
household economic resources was collected directly from one of the youth's guardians.
Moreover, prior to the ¯rst round interview, information was collected regarding not
only household income in the year prior to the interview, but also household wealth
at the time of the interview.6 Because wealth is a stock variable, it is less prone to
annual variation that is inherent to annual income measures, making it an arguably less
noisy measure of a household's permanent income or the household's overall economic
resources just prior to the observation year.
Roughly 73 percent of the all subjects in the NLSY97 had valid information regarding
household income for the year prior to the initial ¯rst round interview and 74 percent
of all subjects had non-missing information regarding household wealth at the time of
the ¯rst round interview. The NLSY97 data on household income and wealth appear
answered \don't know" to a particular crime question answered in the a±rmative to a di®erent crime
questions, it does not matter whether these ambiguous responses are treated as a±rmatives or negatives
since I am only looking at participation. All statistics in this paper were calculated using sampling
weights provided by the NLSY97.
6In 81 cases, no household wealth information was obtained from guardian, so information gathered
from youth was used instead.
12to be reasonable with respect to other studies. As can be seen in Table 1(a), the
median household annual income in the sample used here was $43,250, which is generally
comparable to the 1997 CPS median household income of $46,359 for households with
the reporting householder between the ages of 35 and 44 [U.S. Department of Census,
1998].7 Similarly, the median household net worth in this sample was $51,401,8 which lies
roughly halfway between the estimated 1998 median net worth for households with the
reporting householder between the ages of 35 and 44 of $35,447 calculated using Survey
of Income Program and Participation (SIPP) data and $62,427 that was calculated
using Survey of Consumer Finances data [Orzechowski and Sepielli, 2003].9 As should
be expected, Table 1(a) shows that white youth come from households with higher mean
income and much higher mean wealth than black youth.
Sixty-seven percent of the respondents had valid information for both measures of
household economic resources. One concern is that the youth who did not have valid data
for either household wealth or household income were not a randomly determined subset.
However, as shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, those without valid data regarding
household wealth and/or income information appear to be very similar to those with
valid household wealth and income information with respect to several characteristics
important to this study.
Not surprisingly, for those with valid information concerning household wealth and
7This age group is roughly the relevant group for comparison, since the youth in the NLSY97 are
between the ages of 12 and 16 at the time of the 1997 interview. Therefore, while similar, the households
in the NLSY97 are presumably somewhat younger on average than this CPS group, which may explain
why the median wage for this CPS group is somewhat higher than that for the NLSY97 group.
8Both this household wealth median and the household income median reported above take into
account the weights for each individual as given by the NLSY97.
9Both of these estimates were de°ated to 1997 dollars using the CPI.
13household income, wealth and income are highly correlated. Table I(b) shows the joint
distribution of household annual income and household wealth both divided into distri-
butional thirds. The joint distribution is strongly centered along the main diagonal, with
62 percent of households being in the same third of the household income and household
wealth distributions, and only 4 percent of households being in opposite thirds of the
income and wealth distributions. In households who are in a higher wealth third than
income third, the resident fathers have a mean education level of 10 years (with a stan-
dard error of 0.20). Alternatively, the resident father in households who are in a higher
income third than wealth third have a mean education level of just 7.5 years (with a
standard error of 0.18). Therefore, higher educational attainment of the resident father
appears to correspond more closely to the household's location in the wealth distribution
than the income distribution. Given education is likely to be a factor determining per-
manent income, this ¯nding is consistent with household wealth being a more accurate
measure of permanent income than household annual income.
3.2 Estimating the Relationship between Youth Criminal Participa-
tion and Household Economic Status
Figures I(a)-(d) show the relationship between household economic status and youth
criminal activity, and how the estimated strength of this relationship changes using
di®erent measures of criminal participation and household economic status. The ¯rst
group of bars in Figure I(a) shows the relationship between a youth participation in
any crime in the observation year and household economic status as measured by where
the household lies in the household income distribution just prior to the observation
year. While participation in crime appears to be monotonically decreasing as household
income rises, youth from the poorest third of households are only 21 percent (5.5 per-
14centage points) more likely to have participated in a crime during the observation year
than youth from the richest third of households. By contrast, if we look at the second
set of bars, where criminal activity is restricted to only serious crimes (as de¯ned above),
youth from the poorest third of households are 58 percent (7 percentage points) more
likely to have participated in a serious crime during the observation year than youth
from the richest third of households.
Furthermore, if we control for household economic status using where a household lies
in the wealth distribution rather than income distribution, the relationship becomes even
stronger. The third set of bars in Figure I(a) show that restricting criminal participation
to only serious crimes and using location in the household wealth distribution to measure
household economic status, youth from the poorest third of households are 66 percent
(7.5 percentage points) more likely to have participated in a serious crime during the
observation year than youth from the richest third of households.10
The results from Figure I(a) show that, overall, there appears to exist a strong
negative relationship between youth participation in criminal activity and household
economic status, with the estimated magnitude of this relationship being dampened if
crimes are not restricted to being serious in nature and if a more variable measure of
household economic status is used. This relationship is particularly strong for white
male youths. The ¯rst set of bars in Figure 1(b) show that white male youths from the
poorest third of households, as measured by location in the household income distribu-
tion, are only 16 percent (5 percentage points) more likely to participate in any crime
in the observation year than white male youth from the richest third of households.
10Standard errors for these estimates shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. In all cases, di®erences
across household economic status categories are statistically signi¯cant at the one percent level. Data
are weighted using Round 2 sampling weights provided by the NLSY97.
15However, the third set of bars in Figure I(b) reveal that youth from the poorest third of
households, as measured by location in the household wealth distribution, are actually
75 percent (10.2 percentage points) more likely to participate in serious crimes than
their counterparts in the richest third.11
For black male youth on the other hand, the relationship between household eco-
nomic resources and criminal participation does not appear to necessarily work in the
same way. The ¯rst set of bars in Figure I(c) suggest a negative relationship between
household economic resources, as measured by location in the household income distri-
bution, and criminal participation. In contrast, the second two sets of bars in Figure I(c)
show that when criminal participation is limited to only serious crimes, this relationship
seems to disappear. These results for black males may not be very informative however,
due to the small sample sizes and large standard errors. There are only 123 black male
youths who come from households with income in the top third of the income distribu-
tion, and only 109 black male youths who come from households in the top third of the
net wealth distribution. As can be seen in Table A2 in the Appendix, these small sample
sizes lead to large standard errors, reaching almost 0.05 for estimates examining youth
from the richest third of households. Moreover, as discussed in Hindelang et al. [1978],
black youth tend to be more likely to underreport criminal behavior than white youth.
This possibly greater degree of measurement error, combined with the small sample sizes
in the higher economic status categories, make these estimates substantially imprecise
for black youth.
Finally, Figure I(d) shows that for female youth, while the negative relationship
between criminal behavior and household economic resources appears to remain, the
11As can be seen in Table A2 in the Appendix, this di®erence is statistically signi¯cant at the one
percent level.
16magnitude of this relationship is not altered substantially if criminal behavior is limited
only to serious criminal acts and household wealth, as opposed to household income,
is used to measure of household economic resources. Speci¯cally, while females coming
from the poorest third of households as measured by household income are 47 percent
(8.6 percentage points) more likely to participate in crime in the previous year than
females coming from the richest third of households, this greater likelihood stays rela-
tively stable at 48 percent (4.2 percentage points) when crimes are limited to only serious
crimes and household net wealth is used to measure household economic resources.
Table II parametrically describes the relationships discussed above using several pro-
bit speci¯cations. In the ¯rst speci¯cation, the dependant variable is a binary variable
equal to one if the respondent admitted to committing any crime during the observa-
tion year, while control variables include household economic status as measured by the
household's income percentile, dummies for gender and race, and interactions between
race and household income percentile variables.12 In the second speci¯cation, the de-
pendent variable equals one if the respondent admitted to committing a serious crime
during the observation year, while the control variables stay the same as in the ¯rst
speci¯cation. The third speci¯cation is identical to the second, except household net
wealth percentile is used instead of household income percentile to measure household
economic status.
Looking at the coe±cients in Table II corresponding to household income percentile
and household wealth percentile, the same pattern as shown in Figure 1(a) emerges.
Comparing the ¯rst speci¯cation with the second, the coe±cient on household income
12Dummies for age at time of interview are also included in this and all subsequent probit speci¯cations.
An F-test testing the joint signi¯cance of all the age dummies is rejected at the 10 percent level in all
speci¯cations throughout the paper.
17percentile increases in magnitude from -0.003 to -0.005, meaning there is a stronger
negative correlation between household income percentile and serious criminal behavior
than household income percentile and all criminal behavior. Looking at the third speci-
¯cation, the coe±cient of -0.006 on household wealth percentile shows an even stronger
negative relationship exists between youth participation in serious crime and household
economic status as measured by household wealth percentile. Also, although it is never
very strongly statistically signi¯cant, the coe±cient on the interaction term between
the black dummy variable and each measure of household economic resources is always
positive. This suggests that the negative relationship between youth crime participation
and household economic resources is not as strong for black youth as for white youth.
In order to better visualize the magnitude of these probit coe±cients from Table II,
Figures II(a)-(d) show the predicted probabilities from this probit analysis evaluated at
the midpoint of each household income/wealth third (i.e. the predicted probabilities are
calculated for individuals at the cuto® points for the 17th percentile, the 50th percentile,
and the 83rd percentile). Not surprisingly, the pictures shown in Figures II(a)-(d) are
very similar to those in Figures II(a)-(d).13 The one exception is for black males. How-
ever, these di®erences are likely due to the small sample number of black males coming
from households in the upper portions of the income/wealth distributions. As discussed
above, the large standard errors in each case (see Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix)
suggest that, in neither Figure 1(c) nor Figure 2(c) are the probabilities for black male
crime participation very precisely estimated.
13The predicted probabilities with their corresponding standard errors are reported in Table A2 in
the Appendix.
184 Examining Why the Negative Relationship Between Youth
Criminal Participation and Household Economic Status
Exists
As discussed at the outset of the paper, there are several theories that discuss why
there may be a relationship between the household economic status and youth criminal
participation, including di®erential youth expectations across the wealth distribution,
di®erential neighborhood crime exposure across the wealth distribution, and di®erential
parental investments in children across the wealth distribution. In this section, I attempt
to empirically examine whether any of these theories, individually or as a group, can
account for the relationship between youth criminal behavior and household economic
status shown in the previous section. In order to do so, I ¯rst discuss the variables
available in the NLSY97 that I use to attempt to control for the forces inherent in each
of these theories.
4.1 Controls for Expectations of Future Opportunities
As discussed previously, one explanation for why individuals from poorer households are
more likely to participate in crime relates to the expectations the youth has for his or
her future opportunities. Four questions relevant to each youth's expectations of his or
her future opportunities are contained in the NLSY97 data. In the 1997 interview, 15
and 16 year old youths were asked what they thought was the probability they would
die by the age of 20, the probability they would graduate from high school by the age of
20, and the probability they would graduate from college by the age of 30. Table III(a)
shows that there appears to be a strong correlation between these expectations and
household wealth. While 93 percent of youth from a household in the richest third of
19the wealth distribution expected an over 90 percent probability of graduating from high
school by the time they were 20, only 73 percent of the youth from a household in the
poorest third of the distribution expected the same. Similarly, 81 percent of youth from
the richest third of households expected an over 50 percent chance of graduating from
college by the time they were 30, yet only 55 percent of youth from the poorest third
of households expected this high of a probability. For the expected probability of death
by 20, a similar pattern exists. Thirty-three percent of youth from the poorest third of
households estimated the probability they will die before age 20 to be greater than 40
percent, compared to only 21 percent of youth from the richest third of households.
While the magnitudes of these beliefs are clearly too high (especially in the case of the
expected probability of death by 20), this does not mean these beliefs are meaningless.
Speci¯cally, if the all youth tend to overstate these probabilities by a similar amount,
then the di®erences across wealth groups still re°ect real di®erences in expectations.
4.2 Controls for Neighborhood Crime Exposure
A second reason discussed above for why youth from poorer households may be more
likely to participate in serious crime is that they are exposed to more crime in their
neighborhood. In order to assess the degree of criminal activity a youth has been
exposed to in his or her community I will use dummy variables capturing whether there
is a high crime rate in the youth's county of residence,14 whether the youth felt safe at
school, whether the youth claimed that more than 75 percent of his/her peers get drunk
once a month, whether the youth claimed more than 75 percent of his/her peers skipped
class on a regular basis, whether the youth claimed more than 75 percent of his/her
14High crime rate is de¯ned to be a county with a crime rate in the top quintile of all counties
represented by the sample used here.
20peers use drugs, whether the youth claimed there were gangs in his/her neighborhood,
whether the youth claimed his/her house had ever been broken into before the age of
12, whether the youth claimed to ever have seen anyone shot before the age of 12, and
whether the youth expected a greater than 10 percent chance of being the victim of a
violent crime in the next year.
Table III(b) shows how each of these variables relate to household wealth. In almost
every case there is a strong relationship between each of these measures of criminality
exposure and household wealth. For example, youth from households in the poorest
third of the wealth distribution are almost 60 percent more likely to have had their
house broken into before the age of 12 and 3 times more likely to have seen someone
shot before the age of 12, than youth from households in the richest third of the wealth
distribution. In general, there appears to be a strong relationship between a youth's
exposure to criminal activity and his/her household's relative wealth.
4.3 Controls Parental Investments in Children
The ¯nal set of controls attempt to capture the relationship between household wealth
and parental investment in the children. There are a variety investments parents can
make to that may a®ect youth criminal behavior, possibly including promoting religion
in the household to inculcate youth to value law abiding behavior, nurturing strong
relationships with their children in order to e®ectively pass on values and household
expectations, actively monitoring their children's whereabouts and activities making
it more di±cult for children to break rules, and punishing children who are caught
breaking rules. Moreover, simply the existence of two parents in the household allows
for considerably more parental interaction in all of the preceding ways than could be
done in a single parent household. As Hirschi also points out, as far back as 1950, Glueck
21and Glueck [1950] report a strong ability to predict delinquency from an early age using
just ¯ve factors related to parental investments in their children: discipline of the boy
by his father, supervision of the boy by his mother, a®ection for the boy by his father,
a®ection for the boy by his mother, and the cohesiveness of the family.
There are several questions in NLSY97 that can provide some information regarding
parental investments in child quality. Youth ages 12 to 14 in 1997 were asked a variety
of questions regarding their interactions with their parent(s) at home. The answers to
several subsets of these questions were combined into a variety of di®erent index measures
that attempt to summarize the information learned from each subset of questions. The
indexes used here attempt to capture family routines (e.g. how often youth did activities
together with other family members), the degree of residential parental monitoring, the
quality of the relationship between the youth and his/her residential parent(s) (e.g. does
youth think highly of parent(s) and enjoy spending time with parent(s)), and the degree
of religiosity of the household. These indexes were created by Child Trends Inc. for
the NLSY97 study. A more thorough description of each of these indexes is provided
in the Appendix to this paper and in Appendix 9 of the NLSY97 Round 1 Codebook
supplement.
In addition to these index measures, several other questions can be used to control
for other types of parental investments in their children. First, from two questions con-
cerning how supportive the parent is toward the youth and how strict the parent is at
ensuring the youth does what he or she is told, dummy variables can be created indi-
cating whether the parents are uninvolved (i.e permissive and unsupportive), permissive
(but supportive), authoritarian (strict but unsupportive), and authoritative (strict but
supportive).15 Dummy variables can also be created for whether or not there was a
15These categories were also classi¯ed by Child Trends Inc. for the NLSY97.
22computer in the house, whether or not there was a dictionary in the house, whether
the youth took music, dance, or foreign language lessons, and whether or not the youth
came from a two parent household.
As mentioned in the Section 2, because poorer parents are likely to have more phys-
ically taxing and less time °exible jobs, tend to live in higher stress living environments,
and have less disposable income available for items and activities for their children,
poorer parents may be less able make the above investments in their children than
richer parents. Table III(c) suggests this to be true at least with respect to the variables
measured here. Youth from households in the poorest third of the wealth distribution
score signi¯cantly lower on every one of the investment index measures than youth from
households in the richest third of the wealth distribution. Moreover, youth from the
richest third of households are over twice as likely to come from a two parent family and
have a computer in the house than youth coming from the poorest third of households.
In addition to these time and resource investments, the ability of parents to a®ect
child quality characteristics may also depend on their ability to e®ectively communicate
the necessary information to their children. One could argue that parental character-
istics, such as age and education, make some parents better at communicating these
lessons than others. For example, older and more educated parents may be more ef-
fective at convincing their children that crime and drugs should be avoided, and that
reading books and playing music should be embraced. Hence, the highest grade com-
pleted by each parent and the age at which the youth's mother gave birth to the youth
may also be important factors related to parental investment in child quality.
The bottom of Table III(c) shows, not surprisingly, that parental education and
mother's age at respondent's birth are both correlated with household wealth. Parents
in the richest third of the wealth distribution have 2-3 more years of education than
23parents in the poorest third of the income distribution, and mothers in the richest third
of the distribution are over 3 years older on average when they gave birth to their
respondent children than mothers in the poorest third of the income distribution.
4.4 Accounting for Neighborhood Crime Environment, Expectations,
and Parental Investments
Certainly the variables described above do not exhaustively describe each youth's neigh-
borhood crime environment, expected future choice set, or the parental investments that
each youth is exposed to. However, it is still important to examine whether the di®er-
ences in these variables across the wealth distribution can account for the di®erences
in youth criminal participation across the wealth distribution, or if di®erent variables
and/or new theories are necessary.
Table IV presents the results of several probit speci¯cations, where the dependant
variable in each speci¯cation equals one if the individual admitted to committing a seri-
ous crime in the sample year and zero otherwise. The ¯rst column in Table IV repeats the
coe±cients from the last column of Table II, where control variables consist of household
net wealth percentile, gender and race dummies, and interaction terms between the race
dummies and wealth percentile.16 Speci¯cation 2 further controls for the variables used
to measure parental investment, Speci¯cation 3 controls for both the variables measur-
ing parental investments and the variables measuring parental characteristics variables.
Speci¯cation 4 further controls for the variables measuring the youth's neighborhood
criminal exposure, and ¯nally Speci¯cation 5 controls for all of the previous variables as
well as the variables measuring each youth's expected opportunities.17
16As before, dummies for age at date of interview are also included in each speci¯cation. Once again,
and F-test rejects the joint signi¯cance of all of of these age dummies at the 10 percent level.
17Each speci¯cation also includes dummy variables corresponding to each control variable that equal
24As can be seen in the top row of Speci¯cation 1 on Table IV, when we only con-
trol for age, race, and gender, the coe±cient on household wealth percentile equals in
-0.0062 and is signi¯cant at the one percent level. However, as we add in the vari-
ables controlling for parental investments, parental characteristics, criminal exposure,
and ¯nally expectations in Speci¯cations (2)-(5), the coe±cient on household wealth
percentile continually falls in magnitude. By Speci¯cation 5, where we control for all of
the available parental investment, parental characteristic, criminal exposure, and expec-
tations variables, the coe±cient on household wealth percentile has fallen in magnitude
to -0.0014 and is no longer even statistically signi¯cant at the 10 percent level. This
means that if the variables measuring parental investments, parental characteristics,
criminal exposure, and youth expectations were similar across the wealth distribution,
there would be only negligible residual correlation between youth participation in serious
crime and household wealth percentile. In other words, most of the relationship between
household wealth and youth criminal participation can be accounted for by the cross
wealth di®erences in the variables used here to measure parental investments, parental
characteristics, criminal exposure, and youth expectations.
The probit speci¯cations from Table IV also suggest that each of the theories de-
one if the observation is missing for its corresponding control variable. Therefore, identi¯cation of probit
coe±cients comes only from valid observations, and implicitly assumes no selection bias in who provided
valid responses to each question. In general, very few respondents refused to answer or answered \don't
know" to the relevant questions. However, some sets of questions were asked to only a selected group of
children. For example, many of the neighborhood crime questions were asked only to youth 12-14 years
old at the date of the ¯rst interview, while the expectations questions were asked to respondents who
were 15 and 16 years old at the date of ¯rst interview. To ensure that these variables are not simply
picking up age di®erences between respondents, dummies for age at date of interview were also included
in each speci¯cation.
25scribed in the preceding section provide at least a part of the explanation for why youth
from poorer families are more likely to participate in serious crime. In Speci¯cation 5,
of the variables used to measure parental investments in their children, the coe±cients
on the dummies for whether or not there was a computer in the household, whether or
not the youth had a positive relationship with his or her residential father, and whether
or not the youth was from a two parent household, are all signi¯cant at the one percent
level in the ¯nal speci¯cation. All of these signi¯cant coe±cients are consistent with
the theoretical prediction that more investment of time and resources in youth lowers
their likelihood of participating in crime. An adjusted Wald F-test testing the joint
signi¯cance of all of the parental investment variables in this ¯nal speci¯cation gives an
F-statistic of 4.17, with a corresponding p-value of 0.000.
In speci¯cation 5, the coe±cients on the dummies for whether the respondent's birth
father completed at least high school and for whether the respondent's birth father
completed at least some college, are also signi¯cant at the one percent level, with youth
with more educated birth fathers being less likely to have committed a serious crime
during the observation year. However, the coe±cient on the dummy for whether or
not the respondent's residential mother completed at least some college is signi¯cantly
positive, implying youth with a mother with only a high school education or less, are
less likely to participate in serious crime than youth with a residential mother who
completed some college, all else equal. The test for the joint signi¯cance of all of the
parental characteristic variables gives an F-statistic of just 1.95 and a p-value of 0.06,
making them only marginally signi¯cant as a group. Hence, the parental investment
variables appear to have a more signi¯cant relationship to criminal participation than
the parent characteristic variables. These results are consistent with the ¯ndings of
Levitt and Lochner [2001], who use data from the NLSY79 to ¯nd that youth raised in
26families where both parents are present are less likely to engage in crime, while Mother's
age and parents' education have ambiguous e®ects on criminal involvement.
Looking at the Speci¯cation 5 coe±cients on the variables measuring the neighbor-
hood criminal exposure faced by each youth, we can see that other than the dummy
for whether the county crime rate is high and the dummy for whether greater than 75
percent of peers drink, all other crime exposure variables are signi¯cant at the 1 percent
level. Moreover, the sign in each case corresponds to what is predicted by the theory,
with those youth who faced more criminal activity in their neighborhoods being more
likely to have committed a serious crime during the observation year. The Wald test
testing for the joint signi¯cance of all of the crime exposure variables in this speci¯cation
gives an F-statistic of 19.53, with a p-value of 0.000.
Finally, looking at the coe±cients on the expectations variables in Speci¯cation 5, we
can see that only the dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent expects
a greater than 50 percent probability of graduating from college by age 30 is statistically
di®erent from zero. The coe±cient on this variable is negative, indicating that those
who expect a greater than 50 percent probability of a college degree are less likely to
participate in a serious crime all else equal. A ¯nding consistent with the theoretical
prediction. Testing the joint signi¯cance of all three expectations of future opportunities
variables gives an F-statistic of 4.83 and a corresponding p-value of 0.002.
In order to better visualize the magnitudes of the probit coe±cients from Table
IV, Figures III(a)-(d) graphically describe how the di®erences in criminal participation
across wealth groups are altered by controlling for the parental investment variables,
the parental characteristics variables, the criminal exposure variables, and the expec-
tations variables. In particular, Figures III(a)-(d) show the predicted probabilities of
criminal participation for youth coming from di®erent thirds of the household wealth
27distribution, where the di®erent sets of bars correspond to each of the di®erent probit
speci¯cations from Table IV.18 Figure III(a) shows the results for the sample as a whole,
Figure III(b) shows the results for white males only, Figure III(c) shows the results for
black males only, and Figure III(d) shows the results for females only. The predicted
probabilities shown in these ¯gures can be interpreted as the probability that a youth
in each household wealth third committed a serious crime over the course of the obser-
vation year if the other control variables included in each speci¯cation were identical
across wealth groups.
These ¯gures show quite clearly how the gap in predicted criminal participation be-
tween youth from the wealthiest families and youth from the poorest families decreases
in each successive speci¯cation. Clearly, this is the direct result of the coe±cient on
household wealth percentile falling in magnitude from the ¯rst to the third speci¯ca-
tion. However, these ¯gures make clear the degree to which the predicted criminality
gap between the richest and poorest youths is accounted for by di®erences in the vari-
ables measuring parental investments, parental characteristics, criminal exposure, and
expectations between rich and poor youths. For example, looking at Figure III(a) we
can see that, if we only control for age, race, and gender, youth from households in
the poorest third of the wealth distribution are predicted to be 82 percent (9.3 per-
centage points) more likely to participate in serious criminal activity than youth from
the wealthiest third of households. However, the second set of bars shows that after
controlling for the parental investment variables, the crime participation gap falls to 42
percent (5.1 percentage points). By the time we have further controlled for parental
18As before, for all speci¯cations the predicted probabilities for each household wealth third are
calculated at the midpoint of that third of the wealth distribution, with the other control variables in
each speci¯cation held constant at the sample means.
28characteristics, criminal exposure, and youth expectations, a youth from a household
in the poorest third of the wealth distribution is predicted to be only 13 percent (1.6
percentage points) more likely to participate in serious crime than a youth from a family
in the richest third of the wealth distribution.
Looking at white males only in Figure III(b), we see a very similar picture to that of
the whole sample from Figure III(a). The initial 81 percent (11.3 percentage point) gap
in predicted criminal participation between the poorest and richest youth, falls to a 14
percent (2.4 percentage point) gap after controlling for parental investments, parental
characteristics, criminal exposure, and youth expectations.
For black males, a youth from a household in the poorest third of the wealth distribu-
tion is actually predicted to go from being 44 percent (7.1 percentage points) more likely
to participate in serious crime than a youth from a household in the wealthiest third,
to being 13 percent (1.7 percentage points) less likely to participate in serious crime
after controlling for parental investments, parental characteristics, criminal exposure,
and youth expectations. However, as discussed before, these estimates for black males
are likely to be very imprecise due to very few black males coming from households in
the richest third of the wealth distribution and the fact that there might be greater
measurement error in criminal participation among black males. As shown in the Table
A4 in the appendix, the standard errors for these predicted probabilities among black
males are quite large.
Finally, Figure III(d) shows the patterns among females to be very similar to that
of white males. Where a female from a household in the poorest third of the wealth
distribution is predicted to be almost twice as likely to commit a serious crime than a
female from a household in the richest third of the wealth distribution, after controlling
for parental investments, parental characteristics, criminal exposure, and youth expec-
29tations, females from the poorest third are predicted to be only 16 percent more likely
to participate in serious crime than those from the richest third.
In general, the probit speci¯cations from Table IV imply that while youth from
poorer households are substantially more likely to commit serious crime than youth
from richer households, most of this di®ering likelihood can be explained by di®erences
in variables that arguably measure parental investments, neighborhood criminal expo-
sure, and expectations of future opportunities across the wealth distribution. However,
since this study examines only participation over the course of the observation year, it
does not reveal how intensity of criminal activity di®ers across the wealth distribution.
Elliot and Ageton [1980] argue that frequency of criminal activity may reveal an even
stronger relationship between socioeconomic class and criminal behavior than simply
participation in criminal activity. Such analysis provides an important extension of this
paper.
5 Conclusion
In order to e®ectively prevent crime, it is important to understand what factors make
some individuals more prone to criminal participation than others. This is especially
the case for youth criminal participation, since most adults who participate in criminal
activity ¯rst engaged in such behavior while still a youth. One commonly held perception
has been that youth from poorer households are much more likely to engage in criminal
activity. However, very few studies have been able to empirically document such a
relationship or have attempted to evaluate what factors may account for why such a
relationship exists.
Using data from the NLSY97, the ¯rst part of this paper showed that there exists
30a strong and signi¯cant negative relationship between household economic status and
youth criminal participation. Moreover, this paper shows that one reason previous
studies may have failed to capture the strength of this relationship is because they
may have de¯ned criminal activity too broadly or used imprecise measures of household
economic status. In particular, the relationship between youth criminal participation
and household economic status was shown to be roughly 50 percent stronger when
criminal participation is limited to \serious" crimes only, and household wealth, as
opposed to household income from a given year, is used to calculate household economic
status.
The second part of this paper then examined what factors related to household wealth
may account for this relationship between household wealth and youth participation
in serious crimes. The analysis was motivated by three primary theories. The ¯rst
being that youth from poor households expect fewer options to be available to them in
the future, making the expected consequences to being arrested lower, thereby making
poorer youth more prone to participate in crime. The second theory posits that youth
from poor households are more often exposed to criminal activity in their neighborhoods.
This greater exposure then lowers the stigma associated with participating in and being
arrested for criminal activity, thereby making youth from these neighborhoods more
prone to participate in crime. The third and ¯nal theory suggests that, because of
less °exible work schedules, a higher likelihood of being a one parent household, less
education, and a generally more stressful home environment, poorer parents are less
able to invest time, energy, and parenting skill into the upbringing of their children,
making them less able to steer their children away from criminal participation.
Using the relatively small set of variables available in the NLSY97 to control for
the factors associated with each of these theories, I found evidence consistent with each.
31Furthermore, when taken together, controlling for the variables associated with the three
theories appears to account for the vast majority of the relationship between household
wealth status and youth participation in serious crime. In particular, without controlling
for other factors, youth from a household in the poorest third of the household wealth
distribution were estimated to be over 80 percent (9.3 percentage points) more likely
to have participated in a serious crime in the observation period than youth from a
household in the richest third of the wealth distribution. However, after controlling
for the various available measures of neighborhood crime exposure, expectations, and
parental investments, youth from a household in the poorest third of the household
wealth distribution were predicted to be only about 13 percent (or 1.6 percentage points)
more likely to have participated in serious crime during the observation period than a
youth from the richest third of households.
These ¯ndings suggest several directions for future research regarding what policies
may be most e®ective at curbing youth criminal participation. First and foremost,
the strong empirical relationship between household wealth and youth participation in
serious criminal activity suggests that resources spent on youth anti-crime programs
may have a much larger e®ect when targeted at youth coming from poor households
rather than the youth population as a whole. Second, the ¯ndings related to the criminal
exposure suggest that policies aimed at reducing the overall criminal activity poor youth
are exposed to in their neighborhood may lower their own criminal activity. Similar
to the previously discussed ¯ndings by Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirsch¯eld [2001], these
results suggest that a potentially large bene¯t from dispersing public housing throughout
a variety of neighborhoods in cities, and away from large housing projects, is a citywide
decline in youth crime.
The directions for future policy research arising from the ¯ndings concerning parental
32investments in their children are less clear, as society certainly cannot force parents to
invest more time, energy, and skill in the upbringing of their children. However, the
results presented in this paper suggest that strong adult interaction has a signi¯cant
impact on youth criminal activity. Therefore, a potentially fruitful direction for future
research is estimate the degree to which mentoring programs like big brothers/big sisters,
and community activity centers in poorer neighborhoods like Boys and Girls Clubs, can
a®ect youth criminal participation. Similarly, the policy directions related to the ¯ndings
regarding youth expectations are also unclear, as society cannot directly dictate youth
to have better expectations of their future opportunities. However, youth expectations
may be indirectly a®ected through policies meant to lessen the constraints to getting
a college degree for example. Hence, one potentially important aspect of scholarship
initiatives and/or after school tutoring programs to examine, is the degree to which
these programs a®ect youth criminal participation.
33Appendix
The family routines index was based on questions that asked about the frequencies with which the
youth and his family ate together, did religious activities together, did fun activities together (e.g. go to
sporting events, play games, etc.), and did housework. The answers from these questions were combined
into the index, where scores ranged from 0 to 28 with higher index numbers implying more frequent
family routines.
The questions used to create the indexes for the monitoring behavior of the residential mother and
residential father (if there was one) included \how much does your residential mother/father know about
your close friends, that is, who they are?", \how much does your residential mother/father know about
your close friends' parents, that is, who they are?", \how much does your residential mother/father know
about who you are with when you are not home?", and \how much does your residential mother/father
know about who your teachers are and what you are doing in school?". The answers to these questions
were combined into an index for each residential parent, where scores ranged from 0 to 16, with higher
index scores indicating a higher degree of monitoring.
This index concerning the strength of the personal relationship between the youth and his or her
residential mother and residential father (if there was one) were created using each youth's response to
questions regarding whether or not the youth thinks highly of the parent, wants to be like the parent,
enjoys spending time with the parent, how often the parent praises the youth, how often the parent
criticizes the youth, how often the parent helps the youth with things important to the youth, how often
the parent blames things on the youth, and how often the parent cancels plans with the youth. Once
combined and coded into a single index, the index ranges from 0 to 32 with a higher score indicating a
more positive relationship.
The index concerning the level of religiosity in the household was created using questions asked to
a parent concerning whether the parent felt he/she needed religion to have good values, whether the
Bible/Koran/Torah or other religious teachings should be obeyed exactly as written in every situation,
whether the parent often asks God for help in making decisions, whether or not the parent prays once or
more a day, and whether the parent attends religious services once a month or more. When combined and
coded, this index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher scores indicating greater religiosity of the household.
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38Variable Whole Sample Males Females White Males Black Males
Any Crime 0.28 0.34 0.23 0.34 0.31
0.006 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.02
Serious Crime 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.21
0.005 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.017
Household Income ($) 52,294 52,365 52,219 59,254 32,078
635 879 917 1,110 1,283
Household Wealth ($) 164,954 169,567 160,188 211,350 41,928
6,411 9,107 9,022 12,099 5,868
number of obs.* 6,335 3,226 3,109 1,740 816
Table Ia - Sample Means of Key Variables
 
 
ote: Means for crime and wealth variables, as well as number of observations, were computed from a 
 from a 
 for 
/or 
   
Household Income Third 1 (< $11,750) 2 ($11,750 - $77,750) 3 (> $77,750)
1 (< $24,400) 0.23 0.10 0.02
2 ($24,400 - 51,750) 0.07 0.16 0.10
3 (> $51,750) 0.02 0.07 0.24
Household Net Wealth Third
Table Ib - Joint Sample Distribution of Household Income and Household Wealth
 N
sample consisting of all respondents who completed the 1998 interview and had valid information 
concerning household wealth in the initial 1997 interview.  Mean Household Income was computed
sample consisting of all respondents who completed the 1998 interview and had valid information 
concerning household income in the initial 1997 interview.  Number of observations for this sample
each category were: 6,210,  3172, 3,038, 1,783, 763.  Means for crime categories in this sample were 
almost identical to those shown above.  Serious crimes defined to be breaking and entering a locked 
building to steal, stealing with a weapon or use of force, stealing a car, assault, selling  narcotics, and
earning over $500 from drug sales in the previous year.  All criminal participation information is taken 
from 1998 interview.  Standard errors below means in italics.  All statistics are weighted using NLSY97
sampling weights. 
 
 previous year.  All criminal participation information is taken 
from 1998 interview.  Standard errors below means in italics.  All statistics are weighted using NLSY97
sampling weights. 
 Control Variable  1- All Crimes 2 - Serious Crimes 3 - Serious Crimes
h. income percentile -0.004 -0.005 -
0.001 0.001
h. wealth percentile - - -0.006
0.001
female -0.377 -0.305 -0.276
0.038 0.044 0.043
black -0.150 -0.068 -0.108
0.090 0.101 0.096
black*h. income pct. 0.001 0.003 -
0.002 0.002
black*h. wealth pct. - - 0.002
0.002
hispanic -0.222 -0.084 -0.078
0.097 0.106 0.104
hispanic*h. income pct. 0.005 0.002 -
0.002 0.002
hispanic*h. wealth pct. - - 0.000
0.002
Specification (dependant variable listed below)
Table II - Probit Analysis of Criminal Participation in Previous Year
 Note: Standard errors in italics below coefficients.  Coefficients significant at the 10 percent level in bold.  
Dependant variable equals one if respondent admitted to committing any crime between 1997 and 1998 
interviews and zero otherwise in specification 1.  Dependant variable equals one if respondent admitted to 
committing a serious crime between 1997 and 1998 interviews and zero otherwise in specifications 2 and 3.  
Dummies for age at date of interview also included in each specification but not shown (none were 
significant at the 10 percent level).  Coefficients have been normalized to represent the marginal change at 
the mean of all control variables.  All statistics are weighted using NLSY97 Round 2 weights. 
 Variable Poorest Third Middle Third Richest Third no. of valid obs.
> 90% probability of h.s. degree by 20 0.73 0.85 0.93 2,432
0.02 0.01 0.01
> 40% probability of death by 20 0.33 0.26 0.21 2,388
0.02 0.02 0.01
> 50% probability of college degree by 30 0.55 0.68 0.81 2,427
0.02 0.02 0.01
Household Wealth Thirds
Table IIIa  - Expectations Variables
 
 
Variable Poorest Third Middle Third Richest Third no. of valid obs.
high crime rate in county 0.20 0.15 0.13 6,335
0.01 0.01 0.01
feel safe at school 0.81 0.85 0.93 6,321
0.01 0.01 0.01
> 75% of peers drink 0.19 0.17 0.16 6,224
0.01 0.01 0.01
> 75% of peers skip class 0.24 0.21 0.16 6,297
0.01 0.01 0.01
> 75% of peers use drugs 0.24 0.22 0.17 6,210
0.01 0.01 0.01
gangs in neighborhood 0.50 0.43 0.37 6,290
0.01 0.01 0.01
house been broken into prior to age 12 0.19 0.14 0.12 6,226
0.01 0.01 0.01
seen anyone shot prior to age 12 0.15 0.10 0.05 6,237
0.01 0.01 0.00
> 10% probability of being victim in 1 yr. 0.36 0.36 0.29 2,412
0.02 0.02 0.02
Household Wealth Thirds
Table IIIb  - Exposure to Crime in Neighborhood Variables
 Variable Poorest Third Middle Third Richest Third no. of valid obs.
family routine index 14.89 14.74 15.35 3,857
0.18 0.16 0.14
residential mother monitoring index 9.90 10.20 10.81 3,744
0.11 0.11 0.09
residential father monitoring index 7.75 8.20 8.82 2,762
0.18 0.14 0.12
residential mother relationship index 24.67 25.04 25.74 3,744
0.17 0.15 0.13
residential father relationship index 23.85 24.17 25.43 2,762
0.26 0.21 0.16
religiousity index 2.78 2.81 2.90 4,428
0.04 0.03 0.03
permissive and unsupportive mother 0.14 0.10 0.09 6,063
0.01 0.01 0.01
permissive and supportive mother 0.34 0.37 0.38 6,063
0.01 0.01 0.01
strict and unsupportive mother 0.13 0.13 0.10 6,063
0.01 0.01 0.01
strict and supportive mother 0.39 0.40 0.43 6,063
0.01 0.01 0.01
permissive and unsupportive father 0.14 0.14 0.10 4,428
0.01 0.01 0.01
permissive and supportive father 0.29 0.28 0.31 4,428
0.02 0.01 0.01
strict and unsupportive father 0.21 0.21 0.18 4,428
0.01 0.01 0.01
strict and supportive father 0.35 0.37 0.41 4,428
0.02 0.01 0.01
computer in house 0.32 0.50 0.78 3,875
0.02 0.02 0.01
dictionary in house 0.90 0.96 0.98 3,871
0.01 0.01 0.00
took dance, music, foreign language 0.23 0.27 0.34 3,859
0.01 0.01 0.01
two parent household 0.40 0.63 0.84 6,335
0.01 0.01 0.01
highest grade father 10.44 11.65 13.66 5,532
0.18 0.11 0.10
highest grade mother 11.52 12.49 13.73 6,052
0.11 0.09 0.08
age of mother at respondant's birth 24.10 24.53 27.35 5,972
0.14 0.12 0.11
Household Wealth Thirds
Table  IIIc  - Parental Investment Variables





 1 - No Controls 2- Controls for  3- Controls for  4- Controls for  5- Controls for 
Parental Investments Parental Investments Parental Investments Parental Investments
+ Parent Characteristics + Parent Characteristics+ Parent Characteristics
+ Neighborhood Crime + Neighborhood Crime
Control Variable  + Expectations
household wealth percentile -0.0062 -0.0037 -0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0014
0.0009 0.0010 0.0009 0.0011 0.0010
female -0.276 -0.312 -0.315 -0.339 -0.329
0.043 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.047
black -0.108 -0.177 -0.174 -0.297 -0.289
0.096 0.101 0.102 0.108 0.109
black*h. wealth pct. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
hispanic -0.078 -0.107 -0.086 -0.122 -0.118
0.104 0.107 0.111 0.114 0.114
hispanic*h. wealth pct. -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Parental Investment Controls
degree of monitoring res. mother - -0.022 -0.21 -0.014 -0.015
0.012 0.110 0.012 0.012
degree of monitoring res. father - -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
uninvolved res. mother - 0.066 0.072 0.014 0.006
0.083 0.083 0.085 0.086
uninvolved res. father - 0.072 0.067 0.096 0.108
0.098 0.099 0.101 0.101
permissive res. mother - -0.007 -0.002 -0.012 -0.015
0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058
permissive res. father - 0.047 0.060 0.097 0.113
0.070 0.071 0.072 0.072
Specification (dependant variable equals 1 if youth participated in a serious crime in observation year)
Table IV - Probit Analysis of Serious Criminal Participation in Previous Year with Controls
 Control Variable  1 2 3 4 5
authoritarian res. mother - 0.168 0.167 0.126 0.124
0.079 0.079 0.081 0.081
authoritarian res. father - 0.130 0.135 0.102 0.108
0.078 0.079 0.081 0.082
religiousity of household - -0.042 -0.039 -0.024 -0.017
0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
dance, music, or language class - 0.076 0.088 0.066 0.059
0.065 0.065 0.066 0.066
dictionary in household - -0.114 -0.116 -0.080 -0.082
0.120 0.121 0.123 0.122
computer in household - -0.159 -0.125 -0.129 -0.144
0.061 0.078 0.064 0.064
pos. relationship with res. mother - -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
pos. relationship with res. father - -0.020 -0.019 -0.015 -0.015
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
two parent household - -0.212 -0.198 -0.189 -0.192
0.065 0.008 0.067 0.067
h.s. degree birth mother -- 0.014 0.015 0.018
0.064 0.066 0.066
h.s. degree birth father -- -0.142 -0.138 -0.135
0.062 0.063 0.062
some college birth mother -- 0.124 0.117 0.135
0.071 0.075 0.075
some college birth father -- -0.212 -0.190 -0.168
0.080 0.082 0.082
college degree birth mother -- -0.085 -0.086 -0.062
0.090 0.093 0.093
college degree birth father -- -0.163 -0.120 -0.096
0.086 0.087 0.088
Specification (dependant variable equals 1 if youth participated in a serious crime in observation year)
Table IV - Probit Analysis of Serious Criminal Participation in Previous Year with Controls (continued)
 
 Note: Standard errors in italics.  Coefficients significant at the 10 percent level in bold.  Dependant variable in each specification equals one if respondent 
admitted to committing a serious crime between 1997 and 1998 interviews.  Dummies for age of respondent at 1998 interview and for missing observations for 
each control variable were also included in each specification.  Coefficients normalized to represent marginal change at the mean.  All Statistics weighted. 
Control Variable  1 2 3 4 5
age of mother at birth -- -0.006 -0.004 -0.005
0.004 0.005 0.005
Neighboorhood Crime Controls
high county crime rate - - - -0.019 -0.018
0.061 0.061
feel safe at school - - - -0.148 -0.149
0.063 0.063
> 75% of peers drink - - -0 . 1 1 0 0 . 1 0 0
0.069 0.070
> 75% of peers use drugs - - - 0.204 0.205
0.065 0.065
> 75% of peers skip school - - - 0.166 0.170
0.062 0.061
gangs in neighborhood - - - 0.273 0.272
0.047 0.048
house broken into < age 12 - - - 0.119 0.128
0.061 0.061
seen someone shot <age 12 - - - 0.381 0.379
0.069 0.069
> 10% probability of being victim in 1 yr.  - - - 0.206 0.229
0.075 0.078
Expectations Controls
> 90% prob. h.s. degree by 20 - - - -0 . 1 2 7
0.103
> 40% prob. die by 20 - - - - -0.069
0.085
> 50% prob. coll. degree by 30 - - - - -0.302
0.080
number of observations 6,335
Specification (dependant variable equals 1 if youth participated in a serious crime in observation year)
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Note: For standard errors see Table A1 in the Appendix.  See Table 1 for information on sample and 
definitions. 
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Note: For standard errors see Table 2A in the Appendix.. 
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Note: For standard errors see Table 2A in the Appendix. 
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1-No Controls    2- Controls for Parental Investments  3 - Controls for Parental Investments + Parental Traits   4- 
Controls for Par. Investments + Par. Traits + Criminal Exposure   5- Controls for Par. Investments + Par. Traits + 
















































































1-No Controls    2- Controls for Parental Investments  3 - Controls for Parental Investments + Parental Traits   4-
Controls for Par. Investments + Par. Traits + Criminal Exposure   5- Controls for Par. Investments + Par. Traits 
















































































1-No Controls    2- Controls for Parental Investments  3 - Controls for Parental Investments + Parental Traits   4- Controls 
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1-No Controls    2- Controls for Parental Investments  3 - Controls for Parental Investments + Parental Traits   4- 





































































Note:  See Table A2 in Appendix for standard errors for Figures 3 a-d. 
 Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1  - Comparing Youth with and without Household Wealth Information
Household Wealth Household Income
Variable Yes No Diff Yes No Diff
committed any crime 0.282 0.265 0.017 0.278 0.275 0.003
0.006 0.011 0.013 0.006 0.011 0.013
committed serious crime 0.153 0.135 0.018 0.151 0.142 0.009
0.005 0.008 0.01 0.005 0.009 0.01
black 0.152 0.175 -0.023 0.144 0.201 -0.057
0.004 0.008 0.01 0.004 0.009 0.01
female 0.492 0.473 0.019 0.49 0.478 0.012
0.007 0.012 0.01 0.007 0.012 0.014
high crime rate in county 0.156 0.154 0.001 0.148 0.179 -0.032
0.005 0.008 0.01 0.005 0.009 0.01
median county income 35,411 36,957 -1,546 35,431 36,914 -1,483
119 240 268 121 231 261
highest grade birth mother 12.8 12.6 0.1 12.9 12.2 0.6
0.06 0.09 0.11 0.053 0.105 0.118
highest grade birth father 12.2 12.3 -0.0 12.4 11.6 0.8
0.07 0.14 0.16 0.075 0.134 0.153
two parent family 0.65 0.73 -0.08 0.681 0.652 0.03
0.007 0.011 0.013 0.006 0.011 0.013
mother's age at R's birth 25.6 26.4 -0.8 25.6 26.3 -0.7
0.076 0.14 0.16 0.075 0.149 0.167
Valid Information
 Low 3rd Mid 3rd Top 3rd Low 3rd Mid 3rd Top 3rd Low 3rd Mid 3rd Top 3rd
Whole Sample 0.311 0.280 0.256 0.191 0.156 0.121 0.189 0.176 0.112
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
White Males 0.377 0.346 0.325 0.231 0.186 0.151 0.239 0.219 0.134
(0.028) (0.019) (0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.013) (0.024) (0.018) (0.012)
Black Males 0.347 0.296 0.291 0.222 0.193 0.250 0.218 0.187 0.209
(0.030) (0.038) (0.049) (0.024) (0.031) (0.047) (0.023) (0.028) (0.043)
Females 0.270 0.209 0.184 0.161 0.115 0.086 0.153 0.14 0.087
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009)
Table A2 - Proportion of Youth Admitting to Committing a Crime in Previous Year
All Crimes





Low 3rd Mid 3rd Top 3rd Low 3rd Mid 3rd Top 3rd Low 3rd Mid 3rd Top 3rd
Whole Sample 0.316 0.281 0.248 0.19 0.153 0.121 0.205 0.155 0.114
(0.034) (0.020) (0.028) (0.038) (0.023) (0.033) (0.035) (0.023) (0.033)
White Males 0.399 0.353 0.309 0.237 0.188 0.146 0.252 0.192 0.141
(0.047) (0.030) (0.035) (0.052) (0.033) (0.042) (0.050) (0.034) (0.040)
Black Males 0.346 0.308 0.273 0.229 0.206 0.183 0.231 0.194 0.161
(0.055) (0.051) (0.087) (0.060) (0.055) (0.096) (0.059) (0.054) (0.098)
Females 0.264 0.225 0.191 0.153 0.117 0.087 0.173 0.126 0.088
(0.048) (0.032) (0.038) (0.045) (0.037) (0.044) (0.051) (0.037) (0.044)
by Household Income by Household Income by Household Wealth
Table A3 - Predicted Probabilites of Committing a Crime in Previouis Year from Probit Analysis




 Specification Low 3rd Mid 3rd Top 3rd Low 3rd Mid 3rd Top 3rd Low 3rd Mid 3rd Top 3rd Low 3rd Mid 3rd Top 3rd
1 0.206 0.155 0.113 0.253 0.192 0.140 0.232 0.194 0.161 0.174 0.126 0.088
(0.035) (0.023) (0.033) (0.050) (0.034) (0.041) (0.059) (0.054) (0.099) (0.051) (0.037) (0.045)
2 0.171 0.145 0.122 0.223 0.188 0.156 0.184 0.173 0.162 0.141 0.115 0.093
(0.039) (0.024) (0.035) (0.053) (0.035) (0.043) (0.066) (0.058) (0.101) (0.053) (0.037) (0.046)
3 0.159 0.142 0.126 0.208 0.185 0.164 0.171 0.169 0.166 0.130 0.113 0.098
(0.041) (0.024) (0.036) (0.054) (0.035) (0.045) (0.068) (0.059) (0.102) (0.054) (0.037) (0.047)
4 0.141 0.132 0.123 0.197 0.184 0.170 0.135 0.143 0.151 0.117 0.107 0.098
(0.043) (0.025) (0.036) (0.055) (0.036) (0.046) (0.073) (0.061) (0.104) (0.056) (0.038) (0.048)
5 0.139 0.131 0.123 0.193 0.181 0.169 0.133 0.141 0.150 0.116 0.107 0.099
(0.043) (0.025) (0.037) (0.056) (0.036) (0.046) (0.073) (0.062) (0.105) (0.057) (0.039) (0.049)
Table A4 - Predicted Probabilites of Committing a Crime in Previous Year from Probit Analysis (with Controls)
Whole Sample White Males Black Males Females
 
 